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Commentary on William Lloyd Prosser,
Strict Liability to the Consumer in
California
by
DAVID J. JUNG*

For a generation of law students and lawyers, William L.
Prosser-author of the era's leading casebook and hornbook, and
Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965)- was
Mr. Torts. Law professors knew that Prosser had other talents as
well: he was a satiric lyricist with a deadly aim, whose songs,
performed at the annual meetings of the Association of American
Law Schools, skewered the foibles of his colleagues, his profession
and himself. One of Prosser's best known efforts took aim at an
institution he later would join, the Hastings 65 Club:'
I'm approaching the date of retirement,
Next year on July twenty-nine;
A statutory requirement,
For few die, and none will resign.
I'm tired, and weary of teaching,
Worn down by the ultimate straw;
I'm hopeful I soon will be reaching
The Hastings College of Law
Where nobody reads any cases,
And nobody does any chore;
It's over the hill to Hastings,
Where nobody works anymore... 2
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would
like to thank Jennifer B. Hammett and David I. Levine for their thoughtful advice and
comments.
1. The Hastings 65 Club's genesis and history are described in THOMAS G. BARNES,
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY (1978). When Prosser joined
the Hastings faculty, 90% of the teaching load was carried by the members of the 65 Club,
distinguished professors who had been "superannuated" at their home institutions and
who had moved to Hastings to continue teaching. See id at 338.
2. William L. Prosser, "Over the Hill to Hastings" (sung to the tune of "Over the Hill

HeinOnline -- 50 Hastings L.J. 861 1998-1999

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

Luckily for the Hastings Law Journal, when William Lloyd
Prosser made it to Hastings, he was hardly over the hill. After he
retired from Boalt Hall and joined the Hastings 65 Club in 1963,
Prosser shepherded the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS to
completion, published the fourth edition of his classic hornbook and
the fourth and fifth editions of his casebook, and wrote fourteen
3
articles, among them Strict Liability to the Consumer in California.
Strict Liability to the Consumer in Californiacompletes a trilogy4
of articles in which Prosser traces the evolution of the law of strict
product liability. In the first two articles-The Assault upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)5 [hereinafter The Assault]6
and The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)
[hereinafter The Fall]- Prosser adopts a military metaphor to
describe the attack that brought down the citadel of privity and made
way for strict liability, in what "has been the most rapid and
altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire
history of the law of torts."' 7 With Strict Liability to the Consumer in
California[hereinafter Strict Liability-California],the correspondent
returned from the battlefield to survey developments on the home
front.8
While Prosser cast himself as the correspondent in these articles,
agent provocateur might more aptly capture his role: "Prosser had
been predicting the imminent demise of warranty law and the
adoption of strict products liability as part of his propaganda in favor
of reform... for almost two decades. And in The Assault he finally
got lucky." 9 Lucky, indeed. In the same year during which The
Assault appeared, the New Jersey Supreme Court set aside contract
provisions that disclaimed implied warranties and excluded
consequential damages as against public policy and allowed an
to the Poorhouse"). LAW SCHOOL ASSOCIATION LYRICS, 45-46 W.L. Prosser 1962 ed.
Performed at the 1957 meeting of the Association of American Law Schools by Professor
John W. Reed.
3. William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumerin California,18 HASTINGS L.
J. 9 (1966).
4. Prosser had also predicted that the privity requirement would be eliminated in his
1943 article, William L. Prosser, Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REV. 117 (1943), and in the first and subsequent editions of his treatise on torts, W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941).

See George L. Priest,

Commentary on William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 100 YALE. L.. 1470, 1471 (1991).
5. William L. Prosser, THE ASSAULT UPON THE CITADEL (STRICT LIABILITY TO
THE CONSUMER), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
6. William L. Prosser, THE FALL OF THE CITADEL, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
7. Id. at 793-94.
8. Prosser, supra note 2 at 9.
9. Priest, supra note 4 at 1530.
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injured consumer to recover damages from the manufacturer of a
defective automobile. 10 Three years later, in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products," the California Supreme Court declared that
injuries caused by defective products would be subject to strict
liability in tort, and the next year, the American Law Institute
approved Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
So, if luck it was, give luck its due. Prosser's writings generally,
and The Assault in particular, have been widely credited as
influencing courts to abandon warranty law as the source of liability2
for sellers of defective products and to move to strict liability in tort.'
The Assault's importance is undeniable by one measure, at least. It
may be the most frequently cited law review article of all time.' 3 And
while Strict Liability-Californiawas more parochial an undertaking,
it met a similar reception. Cited in four opinions by the California
Supreme Court, in twenty eight opinions by the California Courts of
Appeal, in twenty opinions in seventeen other jurisdictions, and in
thirty law review articles, the article is one of the most frequently
cited articles ever published in the HastingsLaw Journal.
Part of a wave of scholarship about product liability that4
followed on the heels of Henningsen, Greenman, and section 402A,1
Strict Liability-Californiaretells the story of the Citadel's fall, but
from a California perspective. As such, its value to the California
courts is obvious. At each step in the law's development, Prosser
documents parallel developments in California, providing detailed
descriptions of the governing cases, and indicating precisely which
issues have been decided, and which remain. A court seeking to
know "the law," could not ask for a clearer guide, or a more
authoritative source, 5 and in the early years, that certainly was the
10. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69,95-97 (NJ. 1960).
11. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962).
12. See JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 23 n. 57 (1994); G. EDWARD WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 177 (1980); Jacqueline S. Bollas,
Note, Use of the ComparativeNegligence Doctrine in Warranty Actions, 45 OHIO ST. L.
763, 764 n.7 (1984). James J. White, 1983 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: Scholarly
Book. What, to Whom and Why, 81 MICH L. REv. 723, n.3 (1983).
13. See 1 ROBERT C. BERRING, ed., GREAT AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS 26 (1984).

(looking at both citations in law reviews and citations by courts). Another survey,
focusing solely on citations in law reviews, found the article to be the third most frequently
cited article to have appeared in the Yale Law Journal. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most
CitedArticles from the Yale Law Journal,100 YALE. L.J. 1449, 1462 (1991).
14. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 at 511 and nn.
321-24 (1985) (citing articles).
15. See Kreigler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. 74 Cal.Rptr. 749, 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(referring to Prosser as "our most eminent authority in the law of torts.") Prosser's
treatise, his casebook, his articles, and his role as the Reporter for the influential
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article's appeal. Through the early 1970's, citations to the articlewithin and without California-rely on it as direct authority 17for
statements of settled law, 16 and as authority for extending the law.
A second source of the article's value to the courts is the insight
it provides into the thoughts of the Reporter for the American Law
The
(SECOND)
OF TORTS.
RESTATEMENT
Institute's
RESTATEMENT's

section 402A, which formulates a rule of strict

liability for defective products, has proven to be one of the
Restatement's most influential sections. 8 Prosser rewrote section
402A three times between 1961 and 1964, first limiting the principle's
application to food products (1961), then broadening it to products
intended for intimate bodily use (1962) and, finally, extending it to all
As finally approved, the Restatement's rule
products (1964).
extended strict liability to anyone engaged in the business of selling a
product, if the product is "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" to the product's user or consumer.

The RESTATEMENT's language however, was unfortunate in one
respect. For some courts, the coupling of the phrases "defective
condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" was troubling, insofar as it
seemed to reintroduce an element of negligence to the law of strict
liability.' 9 In Strict Liability-California,Prosser explains why the
phrase was chosen:
The second, and more important, question concerns products that
are in themselves unavoidably dangerous. Whiskey is such a
product. It causes a variety of calamities, from cirrhosis of the liver
to drunken driving... Where only negligence is in question, the
answer as to such products is a simple one. The utility and social
value of the thing sold clearly outweighs the known, and all the
more so the unknown risk and there is no negligence in marketing
the product. But what is to be the rule as to strict liability? Does
the maker of whiskey.., become automatically responsible for all
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS made him a preeminent authority in the field,
acknowledged by his peers as "a great Master of Torts." Lawrence H. Eldredge, William
Lloyd Prosser,60 CAL. L.REv. 1245, 1245 (1972). Or, as another of Prosser's peers put it:
"Prosser on Torts! It has a completed sound, a belonging sound, a natural sound, a sound
to be remembered for years to come." John W. Wade, William L. Prosser. Some
Impressions and Recollections,60 CAL. L. REV. 1255,1255 (1972).
16. See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P. 2d 722,725 (Cal. 1970) (retailers are subject
to strict liability).
17. See, e.g., Kreigler, supra note 15, at 753 (strict liability applies to seller of massproduced homes).
18. See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated& Exploding the "Strict" Products
Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743, 743 (section 402A is "the most often cited
Restatement section in history"). Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle
at the Center of Products Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (section 402A has been
cited in over 3000 judicial opinions).
19. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P. 2d 1153,1161-62 (Cal. 1972).
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the harm that such things do in the world? It was undoubtedly to
forestall such a possibility that the Restatement limited its new
section to products "in a defective
condition unreasonably
20
dangerous to the user or consumer."
Paralleling and expanding upon the explanation given in the
RESTATEMENT's Official Comments2 1 , this paragraph provided a
convenient explanation for the section's language, and in jurisdictions
outside California, it is this paragraph that largely accounts for how
frequently the article has been cited. Courts relied on it as a
definitive account of the role that "unreasonableness" was to play in
the evaluation of a product's defective condition.22 Thus, this article's
importance at the time of its publication is straightforward. It offered
courts and scholars a clear description of the state of the law, by the
most respected author of the time. It also gave the courts an external
source to cite as they sought to explicate section 402A.23
What of the article's relevance today? Certainly the law has
passed it by. The article offers little that would advance the analysis
of the issues now in the forefront of product liability law. The article
merits revisiting, however, for at least two reasons. It provides
interesting insights into an important period in tort law's intellectual
history. It also provides an intriguing contrast with the climate that
has surrounded the formulation of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY (proposed final draft, April 1, 1997).
In intellectual style, Strict Liability-California is vintage
Prosser.24 It displays his characteristic flair for the memorable case.
(After hearing the story of the Happy Daze Buffet,2 I doubt that
anyone could look at a ham and cheese sandwich in quite the same
way again, or doubt that consumers have a legitimate claim to the
law's protection.) The prose, if not reaching the metaphorical heights
20. Prosser, supra note 3, at 23.
21. Also written, conveniently, by Prosser. See Priest, supra note 14, at 521 and n.
366.
22. See, e.g., Cronin, 501 P. 2d at 1161; Cassisi v. The Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140,
1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267,275 (Haw. 1980);
Pyatt v. Engel Equip. Inc., 309 N.E. 2d 225,229 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1974). Similarly, courts have
relied on Prosser's account of the irrelevance of contributory negligence, other than
assumption of the risk, to product liability, an account that also paralleled the
Restatement's official comments. See Luque v. Maclean, 501 P. 2d 1163, 1169-70 (Cal.
1972); Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 93 Cal.Rptr. 270, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971);
Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal.Rptr. 306,314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
23. Although the official comments contain the same explanations, presumably courts
preferred the academic source because California actually never adopted section 402A as
law. Also, the Official Comments do not indicate who the author was, and Prosser's name
lent prestige.
24. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

(1980).
25. Prosser, Strict Liability-California,supra note 3, at 13.
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of The Assault, is accessible, even entertaining.
Prosser's
characteristic determination to cite every conceivable case is certainly
present: In fifty pages, there are over eight hundred citations to cases
for specific points of law. Here, as in
Prosser's treatise, the weight of
26
authority amassed is overwhelming.
More than just the habit of a careful treatise writer, Prosser's
devotion to the case law is an important feature of his intellectual
style. It reflects, as Professor G. Edward White has discussed, one of
the ways in which Prosser was influenced by the Legal Realist
movement. He shared the Realists' belief that the results in
particular cases, more than abstract or general principles, are what
define the law.
Prosser's success as a treatise writer, and his success in this
article, however, lay in his ability to see patterns within the cases'
near infinite variation. Thus, White comments upon Prosser's
"compulsion not to leave his material in an undigested mass, thereby
implicitly suggesting that the discrete case contained the only "rules"
of tort law.27 So, Prosser created "pseudo-rules, classifications that
purported to summarize the 'state of the law' in a given area of Torts,
but in fact were simply devices that aided in summary and synthesis of
a disparate mass of material." 2
In Strict Liability-California,that is precisely how Prosser treats
the question of defenses to strict product liability. He begins by
asserting that "the language of the courts is in a state of flat
contradiction as to whether contributory negligence is a defense to
strict liability for a defective product. '29 "The confusion," he finds,
however, "is a superficial one of words and definition only .... If the
substance of the cases is looked to, rather than their language, they
fall into an entirely consistent pattern. '30 A plaintiff's failure to
discover a product's dangerousness--contributory negligence-is not
a defense, but voluntarily encountering a known unreasonable
danger-assumption of the risk-is.
White's argument is that Prosser's scholarly reputation was in no
small part the result of his facility with classification. Prosser's
classifications of the cases took on a life of their own, finding
acceptance in courts and assuming a doctrinal function despite their
origins as simple tools of synthesis and organization. Here, again,
Strict Liability-Californiaoffers an example. By 1972, when the

26. And, as in Prosser's treatise, the citations are not always completely reliable. See
the discussion in Priest, supra note 14, at 514.
27. WrE, supra note 244, at 161.
28. Id.
29. Prosser, supra note 3, at 48.
30. Id.
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California Supreme Court decided Luque v. McLean,31 the Court
asserted as uncontroverted that "the only form of contributory
negligence that is a defense to strict liability is that which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, more commonly referred to as assumption of risk." The
authority for this proposition? Prosser's article, and two court of
appeals decisions,32 that in turn rely on Prosser's article. Thus, while
Prosser's attention to the results in particular cases showed the
influence of Realism, in Prosser's hands, variation coalesced into
doctrine.
Prosser was similarly able, in his treatise and in his articles, to
balance the Realist recognition of the role that policy plays in shaping
the common law with the need for rules that can both explain and
predict how cases are decided. Thus, here and in The Assault, he
carefully recounts the policy arguments that can be mustered to
support the notion of strict liability to consumers. Some of those, he
finds, are to be rejected out of hand; they "have a specious and
unconvincing sound, and would appear to have been concocted in the
heads of professors rather than based upon any realities of the
situation. '33 The policies that matter, to Prosser, are the ones that
have been mentioned, not by scholars, but by the courts. Thus, in
Strict Liability-California,what is important is that the Greenman
opinion explicitly rests on two, alternative policies-risk distribution,
on the one hand, and the manufacturer's implicit representations of
safety on the other-and that the way in which the law may be
expected to evolve will depend on which rationale the courts
ultimately select.
Thus, policy too is transformed into doctrine, and what is of
interest is which policies the courts will find persuasive, and how
those policies will shape the rules. Jane Stapleton has argued that this
integration of policy with doctrine is a peculiarly American approach
to legal reasoning: "Whereas 'most American lawyers tend to think of
a case-law rule as in some sense... incorporating its underlying
reasons, so that it tends to be a mere guide to decision making,'
British lawyers distinguish a rule from the reasons for it." 34 As a
result, "U.S. legal reasoning is now highly 'substantive,' that is, it is
strongly influence by reasons of a moral, economic, political

31. 501 P.2d 1163,1169 (Cal. 1972)
32. See Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg., 93 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
33. Prosser, supra note 5, at 1119.
34. STAPLETON, supra note 12, at 71 (citing ATIYAH AND SUMMERS, FORM AND
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987)).
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Hand in hand with this

"substantive" view of precedent is an instrumental vision of the law,
in which, as Holmes described it, "the judges' task.., was to decipher
the social 'ends which the rules... seek to accomplish, the reason
why the ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether
According to Stapleton, the
they are worth the price."' 36
"substantive" character of American legal reasoning-the belief that
a rule can always be adjusted that characterizes Henningsen and
Greenman-made it possible for the doctrine of strict liability to
"evolve."
While Prosser found the courts' use of policy in tort cases easy to
accommodate, the tone of his articles suggests that he was less
sanguine about the role that politics might play. In The Assault, he
describes the first, critical step toward strict liability-the elimination
of the privity requirement in the food cases-as "the aftermath of a
prolonged and violent national agitation over defective food" that
took place at the turn of the century.3 7 As a result of this agitation
and the political movement it generated, "time and public sentiment
were ripe for a change in the law of food liability. 38 Yet, he
characterizes the public concern with contaminated food as "almost
[reaching] a pitch of hysteria," and offers, by way of explanation,
"This was the age of the 'muckrakers'. ' 39 He derides Upton Sinclair's
observing
The Jungle, a work credited with inspiring public concern,
'40
that "the portrayal in this novel strains credulity today.
Similarly, in discussing the question of whether there could be
liability for products that had some inherent, unavoidable danger,
Prosser suggests that the "conclusion would be clearly indicated" that
there could not be, but for "the state of confusion [in the case law]
'41
surrounding the question of lung cancer from smoking cigarettes."
That confusion, in turn can be laid to blame on politics: "It may be
unfortunate that these cases dealt at this time with an issue about
which there has been so much popular outcry as lung cancer from
smoking." 42 The implication is that public outcry could only muddle

35. Id. at 70.
36. IM. at 71 (citing ATIYAH AND SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (1987)).

37. Prosser, supranote 5, at 1105.
38. It. at 1106.
39. Id at 1105.
40. Prosser found the book's literary merits even more questionable: "the writer
cannot refrain from expressing his opinion as to how bad a piece of literature it is. As to
style, characterization, plot, incident, dialogue, everything in short beyond the subject with
which it deals, the book is trash." Id at 1105, n. 40.
41. Prosser, supranote 2, at p. 26.
42. Id. at 27
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the law's evolution. Policy could be comfortably accommodated
within the common law; politics perhaps was another matter.
The possibility of drawing such a line between policy and politics
flows from Prosser's times. While Sinclair's America was deeply
divided by ideology, when Prosser was writing, the "end of
ideology" 43 had already been declared: "From the late 1940's through
the 50's... a number of writers agreed that the problems of modern
America were no longer ideological, but technical and administrative,
and that these could be solved by knowledgeable experts rather than
by mass movements." 44
According to White, one of the effects of the trend toward
"consensus scholarship that characterized postwar American
intellectual life" was "a surface reconciliation of doctrinal and policy
perspectives in the field of Torts." 45 Prosser's contributions in his
articles on product liability and elsewhere were critical to that
reconciliation. 46 With Prosser's faith in the ability of courts to meld
policy and doctrine, even the most divisive ideological debate could
be transformed and brought within the orderly processes of the legal
system:
Dean Pound once denounced this [risk distribution theory] as a
piece of "authoritarian law" and a major step in the direction of
socialism. Assuming that we are not nowadays disposed to flee
shrieking in terror from the prospect of a spot of socialism in our
law when the public interest demands it, the question remains
whether our courts, our legislators, and public sentiment in general,
are yet ready to adopt so sweeping a legal philosophy, and to
impose so heavy a burden abruptly and all at once upon tall
producers. Thus far there has been relatively little indication that
the time is yet ripe for what may very possibly be the law of fifty
years ahead. 47
Closer to forty years than fifty have passed since Prosser wrote,
and an entire Restatement-the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCT LIABILITY-has come to occupy the place of section 402A.
Reflecting on the process that has led to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
it is striking that Strict Liability-Californiafails to predict the issues
that were to come to trouble California's and the country's courts as a
result of the move toward strict product liability. Of the issues
Prosser identifies as undecided-the effect of disclaimers, the role of
contributory negligence, the liability of manufacturers to bystanders,
43. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLMCAL
IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1960).
44. RICHARD H. PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 130 (2d ed.

1989).
45. WHITE, supra note 12, at 153.
46. Id
47. Prosser, supra note 5, at 1120.
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and the causation problems introduced when there are multiple
defendants-only the last proved to be a truly difficult issue to
address. The issues that in fact produced the decade of controversy
that led to the adoption of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCT LIABILITY-liability for defective designs, 48 liability for
inadequate warnings, and the role of the "state of the art" defenseProsser completely missed.
Not only did Prosser miss the legal issues that would define strict
product liability in the 1970's and 80's, he also failed to anticipate the
political dispute it would generate. Prosser actually saw the shift to
strict product liability as fairly inconsequential. Strict liability, he
thought, would only change the actual outcome of "such a minor
fraction of the total number [of cases] that the alarm voiced by a good
many manufacturers over the prospect of a vast increase in liability
appears to be quite unfounded." 49 But the alarm did not subside, and
product liability became a political battleground, blamed in national
political campaigns for stifling American inventiveness at home and
competitiveness abroad, and giving rise to a powerful movement for
legislative reform.
How did Prosser miss the boat? Did he underplay the impact of
the changes he proposed in order to make them more palatable?
Perhaps. But more likely, the answer is ironic. Prosser's commitment
to "consensus thinking" did not deny that there were serious disputes
within the law of torts; it simply expressed the faith that the legal
process could resolve those disputes within the contours of a
consensus over shared principles. The possibility of consensus, and
the commitment to incremental change, were not products of the end
of ideology, but, rather, reflected how widely the ideology of
consensus itself was shared. In characterizing the development of
product liability law as merely an incremental change, Prosser, thus
proved himself to be a man of his time, a time when radical shifts
were occurring under the surface of apparent continuity.
Paradoxically, within this climate of consensus, the seeds of a
revolution in the law had taken root under the guise of incremental
change.

48. Here is an especial irony, because the Greenman case itself dealt with a defectively
designed product. See Greenman, 377 P. 2d at 900.
49. Prosser, Strict Liability-California,supra note 3, at 52.
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